Can't Believe I Used to Talk Like This - Anthony Wayne Wright

 This paper will answer the questions of what the military does, both in the GWOT and elsewhere, by citing the highest-level strategy documents: the National Security Strategy (March 2006), the National Defense Strategy (March 2005), and the National Military Strategy (2004).  This paper will use the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006) to describe the difference between what the US military is and what it needs to be, again, for both the GWOT and elsewhere.
            By citing these documents I am answering the questions of ‘Why?’ in the simplest of ways: “Because the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs say so.”  This may sound less than intellectually rigorous, but after working inside the Pentagon for three and a half years I know that these documents matter.  The Department of Defense (DoD) works very hard to shape itself along the lines described in these documents.  The success is muted for a variety of reasons ranging from Service culture clashes (each one picks words from the documents it likes best and interprets them in old familiar ways), lack of support on Capitol Hill (older, bigger, more established weapons programs have more Hill support than smaller, newer programs), and a tension between the vision for a leaner, meaner military (paying for new technology with personnel reductions) and the reality of a manpower and material intensive, two-front war.

            The three supporting military objectives described in the document are:
Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression.  This requires a forward defense, protection for our strategic approaches and creating a global anti-terrorist environment.  The task of ‘defensive actions at home’ is shifting to DHS, per the latest NSS.
Prevent Conflict and Surprise.  Again a forward defense is advocated as well as coalition operations and training of nations to deal with the terrorism threat.  This objective also supports preemptive action versus catastrophic threats.
Prevail against adversaries.  This objective requires major combat operation capabilities to ‘swiftly defeat’ and ‘win decisively’ as described in the NDS.  Additionally this objective requires the capability to conduct stability operations like we are seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Finally the Joint Force must be able to shift between these types of operations swiftly and conduct them simultaneously.
(This objective is at the heart of the war within the Pentagon.  The capabilities and training required for these two types of operations is forcing an explosion of requirements on an Acquisition Corps gutted by downsizing.)  
            The NMS lists the attributes of the Joint Force as: fully integrated; expeditionary; networked, decentralized; adaptable; decision superiority (sic); lethal.  It goes on to describe the 1-4-2-1 force-sizing construct for the required size of the Joint Force.

How we doin', GWOT? - Anthony Wayne Wright

 

How are we doing on the Global War on Terror (GWOT)?  Have we been spending our money wisely?  Is the terrorism-focused National Security Strategy making us safer now and in the future?  Answering these questions is difficult in light of many factors including both the threat and the expansive strategy designed to address that threat.  Measuring our success with any real manner of precision requires a level of understanding of the threat which is, perhaps, unknowable.  Not to mention the question of what constitutes a win when success means nothing happens.  
            Beyond that, however, there are many other issues bogging down the US Government’s execution of this strategy.  Simple bureaucratic inertia, inter-departmental miscommunication, and overly ambiguous strategic guidance all prevent the full application of the instruments of National power.  While the debate may rage on about whether Iraq is the cornerstone of a brave new world or just another version of Athens’s mistaken second front in Syracuse, the fact remains there is much improvement to be made in the more mundane details of running this Government at war.  
            This paper will focus on the difficulties and opportunities in the bureaucratic execution of the National Security Strategy.  It will discuss the difficulties of measuring this new kind of enemy and why it matters.  It will conclude with several suggestions to improve our performance in the GWOT.
As I began this paper, I focused on bringing efficiency and effectiveness to the GWOT by identifying the ways in which metrics and effects-based management could help our national security programs.  I believed that the nature of this very different war was making cause and effect difficult to see and that was the main reason for our bureaucratic inefficiencies.  However, during the process of tying National Security Strategy to amplifying strategy to department toprogram to effect, it became apparent to me that metrics would not generate the efficiencies I anticipated.  There were too many systemic problems which would render even the perfect measurement mote.  
I found that a lack of prioritization of tasks and very little assignment of duties have combined to make every department responsible for nearly every task while leaving none in charge.  In that leadership vacuum each department is pressing ahead with what works best from their own perspective, justified with their own analysis and colored by their own cultures.  Lacking the whole picture, Congress is unable to confidently execute their oversight role.
  There are tremendous opportunities in applying metrics wisely.  Each program should strive to define metrics that are relevant, measurable, responsive and resourced.  Achieving a quantum leap in efficiency will require large, cultural changes within the departments of the Executive Branch, however.  Better guidance, better interagency cooperation and, finally, an interagency analysis and budgeting process  are all required.

JCIDS Process Overview

Previously based in Maryland, Anthony Wright is a former U.S. Navy strike fighter pilot and commanding officer. For five years, Anthony Wright also served as a senior program manager with Ausley Associates, Inc., in Maryland. During his time with the Navy, his work involved defense requirements, which required in-depth knowledge of several processes, including Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirement (NNOR) and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).

Created for the purpose of supporting the statutory responsibility of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in validating joint warfighting requirements, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process represents one of the three key supports of the Defense Acquisition System. The process identifies the capabilities warfighters must have to support the National Strategy for Homeland Defense, the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS). It also identifies operational performance criteria for the successful execution of assigned missions.

The JCIDS process involves capabilities-based assessments (CBA), approval of Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and courses of action, and approval of the Capability Development Document (CDD). CBA is designed to identify the mission, capabilities required, capability gaps and associated operational risks, the viability of a non-material solution, and potential recommendations. Once capability gaps are identified after approval of ICD, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council may recommend a material solution, seek a nonmaterial approach as an alternative or adjunct to a material solution, or take no further action (accept operational risk). The last stage of the process - CDD approval - validates the key performance parameters. 

A Brand New Direction

 I think this sums up a new strategy for my career.  After 30 years of working in National Defense, I can feel myself living in a rut.  I want to try some new things.  This post below is what I sent to Georgetown to get accepted to one of their programs.  I've been studying to prep for it (SQL, Python, Stats and Calc), and I love it!

Statement of Purpose: Anthony W. Wright

https://medium.com/@anthonywwright

www.linkedin.com/in/anthonywrightfairfax

I am seeking a Data Science Certificate from Georgetown University to gain skills needed for my current career in national security industry and to transition to a more challenging commercial career. While mulling a career change, I read a 05 February 2018 Harvard Business Review article ( https://hbr.org/2018/02/you-dont-have-to-be-a-data-scientist-to-fill-this-must-have-analytics-role ) which described an emerging analytics role for translators to "help ensure that organizations achieve real impact from their analytics initiatives." The article sparked my interest as I've been translating between end users and technical teams for years. The article went on to list the necessary attributes, which I possess (see below), and highlighted my gaps in knowledge. Namely, "...know what types of models are available... What business problems they can be applied [to]...[and]interpret model results and identify potential model errors..." This Data Science Certificate would help address the knowledge gaps.

"What skills do translators need?" 

A)   "Domain Knowledge." - I am expert at Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition of large airborne weapons, sensors and aircraft. From understanding customer preferences through to deployment, I have managed large ($100M+) software development and hardware integration programs. With tools gained from a George Washington MS in Organizational Management and a Navy career, I have parachuted into many challenging roles requiring rapid understanding, cultural integration and boundary spanning (or translating). Pilot, Navy leader, Pentagon Portfolio Manager, Acquisition Manager - each position had unique practices, metrics, culture and language. I have repeatedly seen the different "tribes" for what they were, disparate pieces of the same team, and shepherded technologies through development to deployment.

B)   "General Technical Fluency" - I have a long history with quantitative analytics and structured problem solving. Since 2012 I have worked to compete various technologies to determine the net effect of "just one dollar more" applied to a weapon, sensor or aircraft. I have worked with teams of advanced modeling & simulation (M&S) experts on tens of thousands of randomized, multi-entity, 3D, effects-based simulations. Controlling for proposed changes, the M&S produced mountains of data requiring significant effort to make sense of and produce the data visualizations required to help non-experts with real resources to understand. I recently worked an analysis of U.S. Electronic Warfare (EW) systems compared to foreign systems, in light of their faster pace of innovation and transition from analog to digital control of the Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum. This started with an industry survey, moved on to a physics-based analysis and concluded with a series of briefings to the highest levels of the DoD. Converting this analysis to something readily understood was "translating" of the first order. What I do not have, from the perspective of the article, is the expertise in various analytics models used in data science. The certificate will help with the gap in my technical fluency.

C)   "Project Management." - I have ample academic and real-life management training and expertise. I have led large groups of people, 200+ as commanding officer of a Navy jet squadron. I have managed multidisciplinary (administrative to scientific) groups responsible to over a dozen different Integrated Product Teams (IPT) working different projects. I have managed large IPTs working across multiple organizations (DoD, Navy, industry) conducting system engineering resulting in software development and hardware change across multiple product lines (weapons, sensors and aircraft).

D)   "Entrepreneurial Spirit" - Over the last nine years I have connected end user need with new science and technology projects. From securing funding to deployment, I have turned good ideas into new capabilities for the DoD. While looking to address EW needs, I assisted with the integration of a project to field Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) program called Adaptive RADAR Counter Measures (ARC). While hardly state-of-the-art machine learning, integrating that software has pushed the user into accepting systems with more autonomy and distributed machine decision making as a necessary capability. The DARPA Radio Frequency Machine Learning Systems (RFMLS) is the next machine learning step in solutions for EW problems and another capability I'm working to deploy with DoD users. It is closer to current academic thinking on deep learning, and a huge integration problem. This project's potential and complexity highlighted to me a need for more education and training in Data Science.

Data Science is a powerful tool that must be accurately applied to the problem at hand. I want to be a part of it. For Data Science teams to be effective, translators are needed to connect end users with developers. I have been translating between end users and technical teams for more than a decade and have many of the necessary attributes to succeed in Data Science as a translator. The Georgetown Certificate in Data Science is a critical next step for me to obtain my professional goals.

 

https://hbr.org/2018/02/you-dont-have-to-be-a-data-scientist-to-fill-this-must-have-analytics-role

https://breakingdefense.com/2016/11/darpa-ups-funding-for-autonomous-electronic-warfare-work/

https://militaryembedded.com/ai/machine-learning/darpa-launches-radio-frequency-machine-learning-systems-program