Good Words - Anthony Wayne Wright

 Go in close, and when you think you are too close, go in closer.
Major Thomas B. “Tommy” McGuire, USAAF

Second Leading U.S. Ace, WW-II

38 Victories

The Yo-Yo is very difficult to explain. It was first perfected by the well-known Chinese fighter pilot Yo-Yo Noritake. He also found it difficult to explain, being quite devoid of English.

Squadron Leader K.G. Holland, RAF

Fighter Pilot

The winner (of an air battle) may have been determined by the amount of time, energy, thought and training an individual has previously accomplished in an effort to increase his ability as a fighter pilot.

Commander Randy “Duke” Cunningham,  USN

5 Victories in Vietnam

The most important thing for a fighter pilot is to get his first victory without too much shock.

Colonel Werner Moelders, Luftwaffe

115 Victories, WW-II and Spanish Civil War

You fight like you train.

Motto, U.S. Navy Fighter Weapons School

Fly with the head and not with the muscles. That is the way to long life for a fighter pilot. The fighter pilot who is all muscle and no head will never live long enough for a pension.

Colonel Willie Batz, GAF

237 Victories, WW-II

Aggressiveness was fundamental to success in air-to-air combat and if you ever caught a fighter pilot in a defensive mood you had him licked before you started shooting.

Captain David McCampbell, USN

Leading U.S. Navy Ace, WW-II

34 Victories (9 in one mission)

A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all.

Unknown U.S. Fighter Pilot

The aggressive spirit, the offensive, is the chief thing everywhere in war, and in the air is no exception.

Baron Manfred von Richthofen

Leading Ace of WWI with 80 Victories

Any angles you give the bogey on the first pass will haunt you for the rest of the fight.

Lieutenant Jim “Huck” Harris, USN

You can’t fight what you can’t see.

Unknown

The quality of the box matters little. Success depends upon the man who sits in it.                                           

Baron Mafred von Richthofen

Only the spirit of attack borne in a brave heart will bring success to any fighter aircraft, no matter how highly developed it may be.

Lt. General Adolph Galland, Luftwaffe

Being under fire is bad for the nervous system.

Captain Willy Coppens

Leading Belgian Air Force Ace, WW-I

37 Victories (36 of which were Tethered balloons)

Speed is life.

Israeli Tactics Manual

A kill is a kill.

Anonymous

The guy you don’t see will kill you.

Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF

12 Victories in WWII and 4 in Vietnam

If you come back from an operation with a kill but without your wingman, you lost your battle.

Lt Colonel Dietrich Hrabak, Luftwaffe

125 Victories, WW-II

SEE, DECIDE, ATTACK, REVERSE.

Major Erich “Bubi” Hartmann, Luftwaffe

The World’s Leading Ace with 352 Victories in WWII

In my opinion the aggressive spirit is everything.

Baron Manfred von Richthofen

The fighter pilots have to rove in the area allotted to them in any way they like, and when they spot an enemy they attack and shoot him down; anything else is rubbish.

Baron Manfred von Richthofen

In air fights it is absolutely essential to fly in such a way that your adversary cannot shoot at you, if you can manage it.

Captain Oswald Boelcke, German Air Service

Confront the enemy with the tip of your sword against his face.

Miyamoto Musashi

One peek is worth a thousand (radar) sweeps.

Unknown

He who sees first, lives longest.

Unknown

Tight turns were more a defensive than an offensive tactic and did not win air battles.

Air Vice Marshal J.E. “Johnnie” Johnson, RAF

Beware the lessons of a fighter pilot who would rather fly a slide rule than kick your ass!

Commander Ron “mugs” McKeown, USN

Commander, U.S. navy Fighter Weapons School

2 Victories, Vietnam 

Operation ENDLESS JUSTICE - Anthony Wayne Wright

 This paper will look at the legal questions raised by the preparatory and kinetic phases of Operation ENDLESS JUSTICE (OEJ), the operation designed to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1234.  Commander, Joint Task Force Eight (JTF8) is tasked with the following missions:

(1) Neutralize the capabilities of Tawalkana terrorist and Qati military forces; (2) capture those persons involved in the planning and direction of the terrorist attacks; and (3) rescue US and third-country hostages.

Resolution 1234 provides additional context for the execution of OEJ and is important to review prior to any discussion of the legality of JTF8’s actions.  Big picture, JTF8 is tasked with restoring international peace and security. Specifically JTF8 shall:

2(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens;

 2(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;

2(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice.

 

Additionally it may be helpful to look to the National Security Strategy of the United States in light of the fact that JTF8 is not a combined force – all elements are American.  If one were to use the concept of precedence to foreign policy, then it would appear that the Qati Government is a candidate for regime change.  Certainly the National Security Strategy (MAR06) would support this notion:

Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states.  The United States 

and its allies in the War on Terror make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor them, because they are equally guilty of murder.  Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror, such as Syria or Iran, has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice, and peace.  The world must hold those regimes to account.

 

If regime change were the goal of Operation Endless Justice than a period of stabilization would have to be included in any operational plans as well as the development of ROEs for targeting.  The period of stabilization would confer upon the US military a seemingly endless set of responsibilities – security, justice, water, power, sewer, etc.  The success of this stabilization phase would hang on many things, not the least of which would be the support of the populace.  Ergo, if regime change were an objective than targeting the will of the people, per se, would not be advisable as it would threaten the success of the stabilization phase.

         This paper looked at the legal issues raised by the preparation and execution of Operation ENDLESS JUSTICE.  Adherence to the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict will not be the easiest route to the end of the kinetic phase of this war.  It will, however, be the surest route to long-lasting peace now that weapons have been released and people have started to die.

 

Can't Believe I Used to Talk Like This - Anthony Wayne Wright

 This paper will answer the questions of what the military does, both in the GWOT and elsewhere, by citing the highest-level strategy documents: the National Security Strategy (March 2006), the National Defense Strategy (March 2005), and the National Military Strategy (2004).  This paper will use the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006) to describe the difference between what the US military is and what it needs to be, again, for both the GWOT and elsewhere.
            By citing these documents I am answering the questions of ‘Why?’ in the simplest of ways: “Because the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs say so.”  This may sound less than intellectually rigorous, but after working inside the Pentagon for three and a half years I know that these documents matter.  The Department of Defense (DoD) works very hard to shape itself along the lines described in these documents.  The success is muted for a variety of reasons ranging from Service culture clashes (each one picks words from the documents it likes best and interprets them in old familiar ways), lack of support on Capitol Hill (older, bigger, more established weapons programs have more Hill support than smaller, newer programs), and a tension between the vision for a leaner, meaner military (paying for new technology with personnel reductions) and the reality of a manpower and material intensive, two-front war.

            The three supporting military objectives described in the document are:
Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression.  This requires a forward defense, protection for our strategic approaches and creating a global anti-terrorist environment.  The task of ‘defensive actions at home’ is shifting to DHS, per the latest NSS.
Prevent Conflict and Surprise.  Again a forward defense is advocated as well as coalition operations and training of nations to deal with the terrorism threat.  This objective also supports preemptive action versus catastrophic threats.
Prevail against adversaries.  This objective requires major combat operation capabilities to ‘swiftly defeat’ and ‘win decisively’ as described in the NDS.  Additionally this objective requires the capability to conduct stability operations like we are seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Finally the Joint Force must be able to shift between these types of operations swiftly and conduct them simultaneously.
(This objective is at the heart of the war within the Pentagon.  The capabilities and training required for these two types of operations is forcing an explosion of requirements on an Acquisition Corps gutted by downsizing.)  
            The NMS lists the attributes of the Joint Force as: fully integrated; expeditionary; networked, decentralized; adaptable; decision superiority (sic); lethal.  It goes on to describe the 1-4-2-1 force-sizing construct for the required size of the Joint Force.

How we doin', GWOT? - Anthony Wayne Wright

 

How are we doing on the Global War on Terror (GWOT)?  Have we been spending our money wisely?  Is the terrorism-focused National Security Strategy making us safer now and in the future?  Answering these questions is difficult in light of many factors including both the threat and the expansive strategy designed to address that threat.  Measuring our success with any real manner of precision requires a level of understanding of the threat which is, perhaps, unknowable.  Not to mention the question of what constitutes a win when success means nothing happens.  
            Beyond that, however, there are many other issues bogging down the US Government’s execution of this strategy.  Simple bureaucratic inertia, inter-departmental miscommunication, and overly ambiguous strategic guidance all prevent the full application of the instruments of National power.  While the debate may rage on about whether Iraq is the cornerstone of a brave new world or just another version of Athens’s mistaken second front in Syracuse, the fact remains there is much improvement to be made in the more mundane details of running this Government at war.  
            This paper will focus on the difficulties and opportunities in the bureaucratic execution of the National Security Strategy.  It will discuss the difficulties of measuring this new kind of enemy and why it matters.  It will conclude with several suggestions to improve our performance in the GWOT.
As I began this paper, I focused on bringing efficiency and effectiveness to the GWOT by identifying the ways in which metrics and effects-based management could help our national security programs.  I believed that the nature of this very different war was making cause and effect difficult to see and that was the main reason for our bureaucratic inefficiencies.  However, during the process of tying National Security Strategy to amplifying strategy to department toprogram to effect, it became apparent to me that metrics would not generate the efficiencies I anticipated.  There were too many systemic problems which would render even the perfect measurement mote.  
I found that a lack of prioritization of tasks and very little assignment of duties have combined to make every department responsible for nearly every task while leaving none in charge.  In that leadership vacuum each department is pressing ahead with what works best from their own perspective, justified with their own analysis and colored by their own cultures.  Lacking the whole picture, Congress is unable to confidently execute their oversight role.
  There are tremendous opportunities in applying metrics wisely.  Each program should strive to define metrics that are relevant, measurable, responsive and resourced.  Achieving a quantum leap in efficiency will require large, cultural changes within the departments of the Executive Branch, however.  Better guidance, better interagency cooperation and, finally, an interagency analysis and budgeting process  are all required.