Bismarck or Moltke?  Anthony Wayne Wright

Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany, understood the proper relationship between political and military authorities better than General Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke.  As heads of the political and military arms of the Prussian government during the wars of German Unification, serving at the pleasure of the Sovereign, each man ranks at the very top of his respective profession.  Each had phenomenal powers of net assessment and the proper understanding of the relation between military planning and desired political result in limited warfare.  Each worked well to set the conditions by which the other could succeed.  Together they allowed a middling confederation of Germanic states, widely spread out and disconnected, bound on three sides by great powers which did not wish them well, to succeed and rise to prominence. 

What they did not share, however, was a common understanding of the Chancellor’s role in directing military operations once violence began.  Just as Clausewitz equivocated over when (not whether) to allow politicians and diplomats to shape the direction of war, Moltke and Bismarck bickered over the execution of Prussian military campaigns.  Moltke’s desire for a clear delineation of duties between the military and political sides of Clausewitz’s trinity, seemingly without interaction, gives Bismarck the edge in any comparison of the two’s grasp of political-military authorities.

Prussia was able to take its place as one of Europe’s great powers because she had two brilliant and talented men at the head of her government.  Much has been written about their disagreements.  However, the reasons for Prussia’s success are based on Moltke and Bismarck’s mutual understandings.  The environment, the means at their disposal and the proper method to connect ends and means (limited war for limited ends) were (mostly) clear to both of them.  When they did disagree, the King typically made the right decision trusting his First Minister when issues spanned both policy and strategy and his General Staff on operational and tactical questions.

            The General Staff did not take Bismarck’s transgressions lightly, however.  In the years following the Franco-Prussian War the General Staff insulated itself from both the War Ministry and, be extension, the Government.  They managed to create the separation Moltke sought.  Operating in a vacuum, General Schlieffen was able to completely ignore Clausewitz’s warning about this exact situation.  As a result he created a perfect military plan which led to both military and political disaster.